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ABSTRACT 
This writing lays the foundation for a model of natural human reasoning with 
imprecise linguistic information. Key to the model is a collection of abstraction 
mechanisms based on the concept of a linguistic variable, which was first intro- 
duced for this purpose within the context of a semantics based on fuzzy sets. The 
present approach d~ffers from the earlier one, however, in that (1) it does not 
require the use of fuzzy sets for the interpretation of linguistic terms and (2) the 
meanings of logical inferences are given as algorithms that act directly on terms 
themselves rather than on their underlying interpretations. Thus this work consti- 
tutes a return to the more purely symbolic or axiomatic representations of logical 
deduction, whereas the fuzzy-sets model concerns denotational or semantic repre- 
sentations. The new model should not be viewed as a negation of the earlier 
approaches, however, but as an augmentation of them. The present work is 
intended as the beginning of a larger system that encompasses both styles of 
reasoning. 
Two distinct types of logical inference are proposed, together with two associ- 
ated modes of evidence combination. Final sections sketch the design of a 
backward-chaining algorithm through which the various inference types can be 
employed in diagnostic or, more generally, class~icational reasoning systems. The 
algorithm is expected to be computationally manageable and therefore amenable 
to implementation in a functioning inference ngine. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The field of artificial intelligence owes its origins in large part to the 
development of modern logic. In turn, the recent advances in logic are the 
outgrowth of a quest beginning with the early Greeks to formulate the 
principles of human reasoning. During the present century, these efforts have 
grown from an almost exclusive concern with reasoning that assumes classical 
Aristotelean logic to a much broader view that attempts to formulate deeper 
aspects of human reasoning that cannot be represented within the classical 
frame. Early works in this genre include intuitionist logic (Heyting [1]), 
Lukasiewicz's finite- and infinite-valued logics (see Rescher [2]), Lewis and 
Langford's work with modal logics (see Feys [3]), and Reichenbach's and 
Los's development of temporal logics (see Rescher and Urquhart [4]). These 
topics were pursued originally for theoretical purposes, with intended applica- 
tions in specialized branches of philosophy and linguistics. With the advent of 
computer-based automated reasoning systems, however, these studies have 
acquired a new level of practical significance. 
A major actor in this development has been L. A. Zadeh, whose papers on 
fuzzy sets have come to provide the core of what is now known as the theory 
of approximate r asoning. One of the key problems addressed by this theory is 
how to model natural human reasoning with imprecise linguistic information. 
Zadeh must be credited with the first concise statement of this problem in its 
present form, together with identification of its principal subproblems. Briefly, 
it is desired to find an effective means for representing inferences uch as 
"MOST EXTREMELY HIGH-YIELD investments are VERY RISKY invest- 
ments; XYZ is a HIGH-YIELD investment; herefore it is VERY LIKELY 
that XYZ is AT LEAST MODERATELY RISKY." Interest in this problem 
came initially from issues in automatic control theory, but the ongoing research 
more recently has been fueled by the prospect of using it in the field of expert 
systems. In the following this subject will be referred to as linguistic reason- 
ing, to distinguish it from other topics also included under the heading of 
approximate r asoning. 
A variety of approaches to linguistic reasoning have now been proposed, 
virtually all of which are variants of the original semantics based on fuzzy sets. 
An edited collection of Zadeh's key works in this area is that of Yager et al. 
[5]. Other major references include Dubois and Prade [6, 7], Kandel [8], 
Kaufmann [9], Smets, et al. [10], Yager [11], and Zimmerman [12]. Reference 
8, in particular, contains a bibliography of approximately 1000 references on 
fuzzy sets and related topics. Now, after 25 years of research, this area has 
acquired a substantial level of conceptual sophistication and has grown to 
encompass a rich collection of natural language phenomena. 
A second, but closely related, line of development has focused on the 
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management of uncertainty. One approach, explored separately by Baldwin 
[13] and by Dubois and Prade [14, 15] employs a notion of possibility and 
necessity measures. Such measures constitute an adaptation of possibility 
theory that evidently is inspired by the literature on modal logics. Another 
contribution in this area is the subject of Bayesian nets, developed by Pearl 
[16]. This employs classical probability theory to represent the manner in 
which degrees of uncertainty, represented as probabilities, can be propagated 
through a network of events or propositions. A third approach, given by the 
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence (Shafer [17]), is a generalization of 
probability theory that seeks to formulate uncertainty through the concept of a 
degree of belief. 
Although the works in linguistic reasoning are often grouped together with 
those in uncertainty management, the two lines of research are not, strictly 
speaking, concerned with the same problems. The former deals with the 
problem of lexical vagueness and seeks to identify coherent methods of 
reasoning with purely linguistic information, whereas the latter seeks to lay 
down methods for correct decision making in the context of incomplete or 
possibly erroneous information. Thus the former focuses on the semantics of 
natural anguage xpressions, while the latter deals with numerical representa- 
tions of the concept of uncertainty. Nonetheless the two areas have much in 
common inasmuch as they both have to do with approximate reasoning and 
both concern our method of reasoning about he unknown. 
Viewed in this broader scheme of things, the present work is more in line 
with the works of Zadeh in that it lays the foundation for a new model of 
linguistic reasoning. It also shares ome of the concerns of uncertainty manage- 
ment, however, in that it necessarily includes the aim of modeling our use of 
uncertainty-related terminology, as illustrated, for example, by the phrase 
VERY LIKELY in the foregoing example. Thus the task undertaken here 
bifurcates into two subtasks: (1) to model our reasoning with terminology that 
expresses properties of things, such as RATHER RISKY, VERY TALL, AT 
LEAST ACCEPTABLE, and (2) to model our reasoning with expressions of 
likelihood and related notions. The pages that follow concern only the former; 
discussion of the latter is left to future works. 
Some key differences between the new model and those that have preceded it
are as follows. In the fuzzy-sets model, general concepts like Height (of 
people) are represented as linguistic variables that range over a collection of 
terms like TALL, VERY TALL, SHORT, NOT TALL AND NOT SHORT, 
where the meanings of the terms are given as fuzzy subsets of an underlying 
measurement domain, for example, the set of numerical heights from 0 to 8 
feet. The terms themselves are generated from a set of atomic terms, like 
SHORT, MEDIUM, and TALL, in accordance with a context-free grammar; 
each of the atomic terms is given a meaning as a fuzzy subset of the 
measurement domain; and the meanings of composite terms are defined in 
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terms of operators on fuzzy sets. To this end there are specific operators 
corresponding toeach of the hedges VERY, MODERATELY, and so on, and 
to the logical connectives NOT, OR, and AND. Reasoning with logical 
combinations of terms from multiple linguistic variables, as in VERY TALL 
AND RATHER OLD, is then carried out as operations on fuzzy subsets of the 
Cartesian products of the corresponding measurement domains, and logical 
inference, in particular, is frequently given as a matrix operation known as the 
compositional rule of inference (Zadeh [18]). Thus this approach to approxi- 
mate reasoning is purely denotational: All reasoning is done strictly as 
operations performed on the fuzzy-set denotations of linguistic terms. Stated 
another way, the aim of such models has been to formulate a model of 
semantic inference. 
The present model, on the other hand, represents a return to the more 
symbolic approach to formal reasoning, such as that employed in Prolog. Here 
the objective is to define the logical operations, including inference, as being 
operations that act more directly on the linguistic terms. The reasons for 
moving in this direction are varied. First was the discovery of various 
complexity problems urrounding efforts to implement the fuzzy-sets model. 
These issues, discussed at length elsewhere (see Tong and Efstathiou [19] and 
Schwartz [20]), seem to forbid effective uses of this model except on extremely 
high speed supercomputers. Hence there was a desire to introduce some means 
of simplification. Second was the philosophical view that there is a distinct 
power of reasoning that is captured only at the symbolic level. For example, 
only symbolically can we reason about infinite quantities. Third was the belief 
that humans actually do perform much of their reasoning more or less 
symbolically, for which reason there naturally arose the interest in finding out 
if the development of such a system was mathematically feasible. Fourth was 
the observation that if one could devise such a system of symbolic reasoning, 
then one could in this way circumvent another troubling, albeit lesser, draw- 
back of the fuzzy-sets model, namely, that one is frequently required to 
manufacture measurement domains in order to represent linguistic variables, 
such as Preference or Risk, for which no such domains naturally occur. 
Although there is certainly no harm in introducing some nominal scale, say the 
interval [0, 1], for this purpose, doing so seems somehow artificial and 
pragmatically awkward. Fifth was the discovery that, by means of a simple 
term algebra (defined in the following), one could conveniently represent 
further natural anguage notions not so easily represented in the fuzzy-sets 
approach. These include modifiers like AT LEAST and AT MOST and a 
collection of different forms of logical negation. 
For these reasons, the possibility of a symbolic approach to approximate 
reasoning seemed worthy of investigation. The virtues of a denotational 
description of approximate reasoning, however, still remain clearly evident 
from the fuzzy-sets literature. In fact, a purely symbolic system inadvertently 
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incurs a loss of certain forms of semantic richness that exists only at the 
denotational level. To represent he kind of reasoning employed by the 
fuzzy-logic ontroller (Mamdani [21]), for example, a representation f fuzzy 
sets is explicitly required. 
Thus although the present work appears at first to negate the fuzzy-sets 
model of approximate reasoning, it should instead be viewed more as an 
augmentation f it. Indeed, my view is that humans naturally move back and 
forth between the two modes--or more exactly, between several different 
variants of both symbolic and denotational inference--as the situation de- 
mands. Hence there is envisioned for the long term a formalized system that 
simultaneously accommodates both types of components. 
I presented a brief version of the key ideas in this paper in [22], which in 
turn was an accumulation of thoughts appearing as [23]-[25]. The present 
work reorganizes and extends the earlier works, thereby bringing them one 
step closer to concrete implementation. 
2. L INGUISTIC VARIABLES 
A linguistic variable is a variable that takes its values from among the 
expressions in a natural or artificial language (Zadeh [18]). In practice, a 
linguistic variable represents a general property or attribute of individuals, 
such as Height of mountains, while its values express more specific properties 
or attributes of the same individuals, for example, RATHER TALL. In what 
follows, a linguistic variable V will be represented formally as a triple 
(T, D, M),  where T is a set of linguistic terms, D is a measurement 
domain, and M is a meaning assignment, each described below. 
The set T of linguistic terms is of the form E I.J S, where E is a set of 
elementary terms and S is a possibly empty set of synonyms for elementary 
terms. It will be assumed that there is some manner of formally associating 
synonyms with their corresponding terms in E. For each V, the set E is 
understood to contain a unique primary term rp. For example, a natural 
choice of primary term for the linguistic variable Height would be TALL. Let 
ant(rp) represent the antonym of rt,, and let med(r.) represent an intermediate 
term. We shall have that ant(ant(r.)) = r. .  Let r, v, and e be abbreviations for 
the linguistic hedges RATHER, VERY, and EXTREMELY. For the present 
system, it will be required that the set of elementary terms for any linguistic 
variable must have one of the forms 
FI: {ant(rp), rp} 
F2: {ant(rp), med(rp), rp} 
F3: {ant(rp), r-ant(rp), med(rp), r-rp, rp} 
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F4: {v-ant(rp) ,ant(rp) ,med(rp) ,  , v-rp} 
F5: {v-ant(rp) ,ant(rp) , r -ant(rp) ,med(rp) , r - rp,  zp, v-rp} 
F6: {e-ant(rp), v-ant(rp) ,ant(rp) , r -ant(rp) ,med(zp) , r - rp,  rp, v-rp, 
e-rp} 
Whichever form is used, we shall assume that the indicated terms are ordered 
by a relation < in the order shown. The restriction to a maximum of nine 
elementary terms is based on the observation that in ordinary human discourse 
one seldom needs more than nine levels of distinction. On the other hand, there 
would be no problem in expanding this to a larger number or to the use of less 
rigidly structured term sets should the situation demand. This would only 
require making appropriate corresponding changes in certain of the definitions 
below, in order to preserve coherence for the overall system. 
If nonempty, the set S contains alternative linguistic equivalents for mem- 
bers of E. For example, if V = Height, with primary term TALL, then likely 
choices of synonyms for med(rp) and ant(rp) would be MEDIUM and 
SHORT. In addition, S might contain phrases considered to be equivalent with 
an elementary term; for example, the synonyms for med(TALL) might further 
include the expression NEITHER_TALLNOR_SHORT. The introduction of 
synonyms into the system provides naturalness of use and enriches the system's 
overall expressive power. They play no essential role in any of the deduction 
schemes, however, because deductions are defined exclusively on elementary 
terms. Hence, in the following, whenever a member of S appears in a formal 
deduction, it will implicitly be assumed to represent the corresponding elemen- 
tary term. 
In some instances there will be more that one natural choice of primary term 
for a given linguistic variable. For example, if V = Age, then one might set 
rp = OLD or rp = YOUNG. It is implicit in the foregoing definition that one 
obtains a distinct linguistic variable for each such choice of primary term. Two 
linguistic variables will be duals of one another if they differ only in that their 
primary terms are antonyms. 
The measurement domain D is a set of objects that is used to provide 
meanings for the terms in T. For example, if V = Age is intended as a 
linguistic variable for ages of people, then a choice for D might be the ages in 
years from 0 to 150. It is also allowed that D be empty. Such would be 
appropriate for linguistic variables like Kindness, for which there is no 
presumed measurement scale. 
The meaning assignment M is defined only if D ;e D. There will be three 
permissible interpretation schemes. For r e T, M(r )  is either 
1. A subinterval of D, 
2. A fuzzy compatibility function on D, or 
3. A probability distribution over D. 
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In the present treatment, he mapping M is used only to determine which term 
in T should be ascribed to an individual A, given some measurement x for A 
along D. This means that M plays no essential role, and in fact is not 
required, for purposes of the inference schemes defined below. In an expanded 
system that also incorporates the compositional rule of inference and similar 
methods of fuzzy reasoning, however, the mapping M will be required for 
any linguistic variables to which such inference methods are to be applied. 
To illustrate the subinterval scheme, suppose that M is defined for a version 
of Age so that M(YOUNG) = [15, 291. Then, if individual A is determined 
to be 24 years old, say, one would ascribe to A the term YOUNG. In order 
that this interpretation scheme make sense it is necessary only that the intervals 
be nonoverlapping and that they cover the entire domain D. 
The idea of a compatibility function was introduced by Zadeh [18]. In effect, 
this is the membership function for a fuzzy set that is being used to represent 
the meaning of a linguistic term. In this case, the degree of membership of an 
element x in the given fuzzy set is interpreted as the degree of  compatibility 
that an individual with measurement x will have with the corresponding term. 
An intuitively acceptable way of assigning compatibility functions for this 
purpose would be to interpret the maximum, minimum, and intermediate rms 
(under < on T), respectively, as a standard S curve, an inverted S curve, and 
some collection of convex normal curves, defined according to schemes SS, IS, 
and CN as follows. Let a, b, c~D,  with a _ b _< c, and let e be a real 
number strictly greater than 0. Assuming that D is a subset of the reals, we 
may define 
SS(x: a, b, e) = 
IS(x: a, b, e) = 
CN(x:  a, b, c, e) = 
O, 
2e- ' [ (x -a ) / (b -a ) ]  e, 
1 - 2e - l [ (b  - x) / (b  - a)] e, 
1, 
1 - 2e - ' [ (x  - a)/ (b - a)] e, 
2e- l [ (b  - x) / (b  - a)] e, 
O, 
O, 
SS(x: a, b, e),  
IS(x:  a, b, e), 
O, 
i f x<a 
1 
if a <_x <_ -~(a + b) 
1 




i fa_<x<_ ~(a+b)  
1 
i f -~(a+b)  <x<b 
i f x>b 
if x<_a 
if a<_x<_b 
i fb<_x<_c  
i fx>c  
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A crossover point for a compatibility function is a point in D where the 
function takes the value ½, and a normal point is one where the value is 1. In 
SS and IS, the only crossover point is ½(a + b), whereas for CN the crossover 
points are ½(a + b) and ½(b + c). The normal points for SS and IS are 
evident from the definitions; the only normal point for CN is b. The exponent 
e determines the rate at which the curves increase and decrease; when e = 1 
the curves are linear. For D again the interval [0, 150] of ages of people, a 
typical meaning assignment would be 
M(YOUNG)(x)  = CN(x:  15,22.5,30,2) 
thus giving for each x E D the degree of compatibility that an individual of age 
x will have with the term YOUNG. Note that if YOUNG happened to be the 
smallest erm with respect o < in the given term set, it would be more 
natural to use the scheme IS than CN. The underlying intuition is that the 
functions hould represent the meanings of the terms as they would be used in 
the context of the given collection. In the above definition for M(YOUNG), it 
is assumed that the term set includes lesser terms, like VERY YOUNG, with 
which the lower ages will be more compatible. 
The use of such definition schemes is, of course, arbitrary; one may 
certainly use other means. For example, a compatibility function might be 
given simply as a set of data points that have been subjected to some form of 
smoothing. All that is really required for the present purposes is that each 
element in D have maximal compatibility with a unique term in E. 
If probability distributions are used, then one ascribes to A the term for 
which A's age has the highest probability. Note that in this case it would be 
natural to use probability distributions determined by a statistical sampling of 
expert opinions. For example, M(YOUNG) would be given as a distribution 
over the above D whose value for each x ¢D is the probability that an 
arbitrary human would assign the term YOUNG to an individual of age x. In 
order for this interpretation scheme to be useful for the intended purpose, it is 
necessary that it satisfy a uniqueness condition analogous to that mentioned 
above. Given the nature of human perceptions, it is not unreasonable toexpect 
that this would normally occur. 
Note that an elementary term set E for a linguistic variable V is completely 
specified by giving a primary term rj, and a term set form indicated by a code 
F1 , - . ' ,  F6. Hence a linguistic variable can alternatively be represented by a 
4-tuple in the manner of V = (~'p, F-code, D, M). In addition, the latter two 
entries may be omitted if D = ~. Thus the definition Temperature = 
(HOT, F3) specifies a linguistic variable with no measurement domain whose 
term set is {ant(HOT), med(HOT), HOT}. If synonyms are also to be em- 
ployed, one would expand this to allow for explicit mention of the set S. 
Reasoning with Imprecise Linguistic Information 471 
3. INFERENCE MODE I: RANK COMPUTATION 
We now turn to the first of the two forms of inference to be studied in this 
paper. This is intended to produce, in a computationaUy simpler manner, 
results that are analogous to those of Zadeh's compositional rule of inference. 
An earlier version appeared as [23]. There the problem was limited to 
consideration of elementary decision rules having the form 
T I , ' '  ", Tn =O" T 
where r l , - - - ,  r n and r are given as linguistic terms (from typically distinct 
linguistic variables) considered as unary relations, all of the same individual 
variable. To illustrate, where E -- EXPERIENCED, A = AMBITIOUS, C 
= CREATIVE, and S = SUITABLE are terms from four appropriate chosen 
linguistic variables, the inference 
E(X) ,  A (X) ,C(X)  = S(X)  
might be used to determine the suitability of an arbitrary individual X for an 
employment position. The deduction algorithm is defined in such a way that an 
individual's having a strong rating along one hypothesis will counterbalance 
that individual's having a weak rating along another. For example, even 
though individual A might be only RATHER EXPERIENCED, if A is 
VERY AMBITIOUS and CREATIVE, then A should be SUITABLE. This 
notion of counterbalancing has been adapted from well-known methods of 
multicriterion decision making. 
Here this method is extended to include terms that represent n-ary relations 
for n >_ 0 as well as to permit a few additional variations. One will now be 
able to express inferences such as 
SIMILAR(X, r )  = SIMILAR( Y, X )  
and, where PREF denotes a preference relation, to express inferences such as 
PREF(X,  Y),  PREF( Y, Z) = PREF(X,  Z) 
One will also be able to make more specialized requirements on what such 
inferences hould mean. When n = 0, the terms are taken as expressing 
general states of affairs, as in 
CLOUDS =, POSSIBLE_SHOWERS 
The type of inference that captures these phenomena dmits of several 
variants. We shall begin by describing the simplest and most straightforward 
version, and then consider some ways in which this might be modified. In this 
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way we implicitly describe ageneral methodology for defining a certain variety 
of logical inference, rather than attempt to prescribe any particular inference 
mechanism. In an implementation, the different variants would all be available 
simultaneously, with each inference rule explicitly defined in terms of a 
specific one of them. 
Where the sequence X~, . . . ,  X m is a subsequence of Xl, l , - - . ,  
XI, m~," ", Xn, 1," " ", Xn, m., let 
rl( X l , l , ' ' ' ,  Xl,m,), ' ' ' ,  Tn( Xn, l,' ' ", Xn, m,) =*' r( X[," " ,  Xm) (1) 
be an inference composed of linguistic terms from the term sets for some not 
necessarily distinct linguistic variables V1,. . . ,  Vn, V. Suppose that, for some 
individuals Al, 1 , ' " ,  An, ran' it has been determined that all of 
r i (A , , , , ' " ,  A, ,m,), '" ,  r~,(An,,,'", An.m.) (2) 
hold true, where r~, . . . ,  r n are from the term sets for V l , . . . ,  V n. The 
problem is to choose a term r'  from the term set for V for which one may 
conclude 
l"( A l , . . . ,  Am) (3) 
To this end, we define a rank e for all terms r by: 0(r) is equal to one of 
-4, .  " ,  4 according as r has one of the respective forms e-ant(r p), v-ant(rp), 
ant(rp), r-ant(rp), med(rp), r-rp, rp, v-r,, e-rp, for some linguistic variable 
V. Next we define a distance measure 6 on terms r, r' from an arbitrary V 
by 
= 
The measure 6 forms the basis for the inference algorithm. Let r l , .  •. ,  %, r, 
and r~, ' " ,  r~ be as in (1), (2), and (3). For the simplest variant under 
inference mode I, let the concluding r '  be the term from the term set for V for 
which the distance fi(r, r') is closest o 
n 
i=1 
It is easily verified that this yields the counterbalancing effect described at the 
beginning of this section. 
Note that if we regard linguistic terms as relation symbols in a first-order 
language, each inference of the form (1) is more exactly an encoding of an 
entire collection of first-order logical inferences, given by simultaneous selec- 
tions from the term sets for the premises. For example, in an inference with 
three premises, if the term sets of the associated linguistic variables have five, 
nine, and three terms, then the number of specific inferences encoded would be 
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5 x 9 x 3 = 135. Thus inferences of type I actually serve more as meta-asser- 
tions, or inference schema. 
Further variants can be obtained by modifying either the ranking scheme g 
or the summation o. For example, another reasonable ranking assignment 
might be the following. For each V with term set T, 
1. If T consists of only the two terms ant(rp) and rp (i.e., is of the form 
F1), then set o(ant(~'p)) = - 1 and p(rp) = 1. 
2. In all of the five other cases (forms F2-F6), set g(med(rp)) = 0, assign 
the terms greater than med(zp), with respect o the ordering < , in 
increasing order the positive integers 1,2 . . . . .  and assign the terms less 
than med(rp) in decreasing order the negative integers - 1, - 2 . . . . .  
A way to modify the summation formula can be shown by example. 
Consider linguistic variables Age = (VERY_OLD, F2) and Strength = 
(STRONG, F1). Define the synonym 
NEITHER_VERY_OLD_NOR_VERY_YOUNG = med(VERY_OLD) 
and suppose one wants to model the situation where 
VERY OLD implies WEAK 
VERY_YOUNG implies WEAK 
and 
NEITHER_VERY_OLD_NOR VERY_YOUNG implies STRONG 
This can be accomplished by letting the inference read 
NEITHER_ VERY_ OLD_ NOR _ VERY_ YOUNG ( X ) = STRONG (X)  
applying the original ranking scheme, and setting o = - [2 x ~(r, r31. 
As a final example, further illustrating the type of reasoning intended under 
mode I, consider linguistic variables Temperature = (WARM, F6) and Com- 
fort = (COMFORTABLE, F5) with inference 
WARM = COMFORTABLE 
As synonyms one might have 
VERY_HOT = EXTREMELY WARM 
HOT = VERY WARM 
LUKEWARM = RATHER WARM 
MEDIUM = med(WARM) 
MODERATELY COOL = RATHER ant(WARM) 
COOL = ant(WARM) 
COLD = VERY ant(WARM) 
VERY_COLD = EXTREMELY ant(WARM) 
UNCOMFORTABLE = ant(COMFORTABLE) 
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Let the ranks of the elementary terms for Temperature be, in increasing order 
(according to the < relation for terms), the integers -3 ,  -2 ,  
- 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 3; let those for Comfort be, also in increasing order, - 3, 
-2 ,  - 1, 99, 99, 0, 99, 99; and let a be as in the preceding example. Then 
one has effectively encoded all the following: 
WARM or LUKEWARM or MEDIUM or MODERATELY_COOL 
implies COMFORTABLE 
COOL implies RATHER UNCOMFORTABLE 
HOT or COLD implies UNCOMFORTABLE 
and 
VERY_HOT or VERYCOLD implies VERY UNCOMFORTABLE 
Thus one sees that by merely working with numerical ranks, inference mode I
offers a quite varied collection of reasoning techniques. 
A related method was discussed by Lee and Schwartz in [26]. There 
linguistic terms were reinterpreted via some "generic" possibility distributions 
over the interval [0, 1], and the distance measure ~ was given as a special 
horizontal distance between such distributions. This has the advantage that the 
distance measure to a certain extent reflects the shape of the distributions. But 
it has the disadvantage that the measure is not additive: for terms 7.1, r2, and 
r 3 from the same linguistic variable, one does not in general have that 
~(rl, 7"3) = ~5(7.1, 7"2) + ~(r2, 7"3)" 
Another idea, also considered in [26], is to apply weighting factors to the 
distances in the summation, reflecting that some of the hypotheses are more 
important han others. This further exploits well-known methods of multicri- 
teflon decision analysis. 
4. INFERENCE MODE II: TERM ALGEBRA 
Earlier versions of the ideas in this section have appeared in [24] and [25]. 
Here the definitions of Section 2 must be expanded to include a set of operators 
defined generally for all linguistic variables. In addition to proposing some 
intuitively plausible renditions of these operators, the definitions also serve to 
illustrate a general definition method. It should be clear that further such 
operators can similarly be introduced by these means. 
Let V be a linguistic variable with term set T. The expressions of V are 
defined as follows: (1) Terms in T are expressions of V, (2) if r is a term in 
T, then all of NOT o r, NOT s r, NOT a r, NOT v r, AT LEAST r, and AT 
MOST r are expressions of V, (3) if e and e' are expressions of V, then (e 
OR ~'), (e AND e'), and NOT t e are expressions of V. 
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We shall extend the notion of synonym to expressions. For example, in a 
linguistic variable Performance = (GOOD, F5), STRONG might be taken as a 
synonym for the expression GOOD OR VERY GOOD. 
Each expression ~ of V will be provided with a relative meaning p(E), 
given as a subset of T. Here "relativity" is with respect o the set T. 
Throughout the following, let < be the ordering defined on members of T, 
with _ including as usual the possibility of equality. For the special case of 
form F1, where T does not contain the term med(rp), assume that statements 
such as r _ med(rp) are replaced by the analogous statements involving ranks, 
e(r) --- O. 
For arbitrary r e T, set 
Thus the relative meaning of any term is just the singleton containing the term 
itself. For arbitrary expressions e, e' of V, set 
and 
p(NOT, ¢) = T -  p(¢) 
p(, OR '3 = V p(,9 
p(e AND e') = p(e) N p(e') 
where - ,  U, and f~ are the ordinary set operations. It is easily verified that 
any term set having one of the forms F I -F6,  together with the above three 
operations, comprises a Boolean algebra, It follows that any expression made 
up in this manner of ORs, ANDs, and NOTts is representable as a unique 
subset of T. For example, 
p(NOTt YOUNG AND (YOUNG OR VERY YOUNG)) 
reduces uniquely to {VERY YOUNG}. 
By virtue of this interpretation scheme, any subset T' of T can be taken as 
representing the logical disjunction of the terms in T'. The special case that 
p(e) = IJ is taken as saying that ~ is contradictory. It follows that the 
conjunction of any two distinct elementary terms is contradictory. 
The particular form of NOT defined above is called total negation and is 
interpreted as expressing "anything except e." We now consider the four 
other forms of NOT and the two adjectival phrases. 
• Ordered Negation. A very common form of negation is one wherein 
NOT r means "something less than r "  if r is above med(rp) and 
"something more than r "  if z is below med(rp). This can be represented 
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here as an operator NOT o defined by 
I < 
p(NOTor ) = {r ' l r '  >r} ,  
undefined, 
if ~" > med(rp) 
if r < med(rp) 
if r = med(rp) 
• Strong Ordered Negation. A form that is closely related to ordered 
negation is one in the sense of "not at all r , "  which would naturally 
apply only to either rp or ant(rp). This can be defined by 
{, ' l  ~' < med(rr)}, if r = 7"p 
p(NOT~ r) = {r, lr, > med(rr)} ' if r = ant(rp) 
undefined, otherwise 
A possible variant of this might additionally include a clause for "not at 
all med(rp)," represented asa subset of T with a gap in the middle. How 
this is defined, however, may depend on which form of T is being 
employed. 
• Antonymical Negation. Another frequently used form of negation is the 
reference to the antonym of a term. This also will ordinarily be applied 
only to either rp or ant(7"p). We have 
ant ( rp ) ,  i f  = 
0(NOT a r) = rp, if r = ant(rp) 
[ undefined, otherwise 
• The "Not  Very" Negation. In the literature on fuzzy logic, one 
frequently finds a term like NOT VERY TALL being interpreted as 
meaning the same thing as VERY SHORT. In everyday English, how- 
ever, this expression more often means omething like RATHER TALL. 
Thus we may define 
r-rp, if r = v-rp 
o(NOT v r) = ~ r-ant(rp), if r = v-ant(r u) 
[ undefined, otherwise 
• The Modifier "At  Least." This operator can be defined by 
({r '  I r '  > r}, if r > med (rp) 
p(AT_LEAST T) / 
({~" l r '  --< r}, i f r<med(rp)  
A possible synonym for AT_LEAST would be NO_LESSTHAN. 
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• The Modif ier "At  Most . "  This can be defined by 
p(AT_MOST r) = / {r ' l  r '  -< r}, if r >- med(rp) 
({ r ' l r '  >r} ,  i f r<med(rp)  
A synonym for AT_MOST would be NO_MORE_THAN. 
We now consider deductions under inference mode II. Here inferences have 
the same syntactic form as for mode I, with the exception that the premises and 
conclusions may be expressions. Thus, where T = TALL, S = SHORT, and 
A = ACCEPTABLE, one may have inferences such as 
(NOT o TAND NOT o S) (X)  = AT LEAST A(X)  
and, where AL abbreviates AT_LEAST and PREF denotes a preference 
relation, one can write 
AL PREF(X,  Y) ,  AL PREF( Y, Z) = AL PREF(X,  Z) 
The associated eduction algorithm is as follows. Where the collection of 
variables X . . . .  , ' . . ,  X~ ,,,, let 1, X m is a subset of XI ,  1," XI. m|, , 
El(X1.1,''', Xl.mt),''',En(Xn, l ' ' ' ,  Xn, mn) :=~ E(X;,..., Xm) 
be an inference composed of expressions from some not necessarily distinct 
linguistic variables VI , . - . ,  V,, V. A premise ei(Xi, 1 . . . . .  Xi, m,) is said to 
be satisfied for individuals A i. 1," " ", A i. mj if we have that the instantiated 
expression e~( Ai,  1 , ' " ,  Ai ,  m) holds and 
Then the algorithm is: If all the premises are satisfied in this way by 
individuals A1, l . . . . .  An, m,, one can conclude 
Am) 
t • . i i where A I, ., A m are the individuals corresponding to X~, . . . ,  X m. 
As with mode I, this form of inference also provides mechanisms through 
which one can express rather complex interrelationships between linguistic 
variables. For example, consider the relation between Age and Strength of the 
preceding section. With linguistic variables, including synonyms, as before, 
the identical results can be obtained with the rule 
VERY_OLD_OR_VERY_YOUNG(X) = WEAK(X)  
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together with any one of 
NEITHER VERY_OLD_NOR_VERYYOUNG(X) ~ STRONG(X) 
NOTt(VERY_OLD) AND NOT t (VERY_YOUNG)(X) ~ STRONG(X) 
NOTtC4ERY_OLD_OR_VERY YOUNG)(X) ~ STRONG(X) 
Similarly, the previous relationship between Temperature and Comfort can be 
expressed by the collection 
WARM OR LUKEWARM OR MEDIUM OR MODERATELYCOOL 
COMFORTABLE 
COOL ~ RATHER UNCOMFORTABLE 
HOT OR COLD ~ UNCOMFORTABLE 
VERYHOT OR VERY_COLD ~ VERY UNCOMFORTABLE 
As is evident from these examples, an advantage of using mode II is that it 
allows one to more explicitly state the desired logical relationships. A disad- 
vantage is that it typically requires the writing of more than one rule. 
Since premises for inferences in this mode are either satisfied or not, and a 
conclusion follows only if all its premises are satisfied, this yields inferences 
that agree with the truth table for the classical if-then. In fact, by defining 
elementary terms and synonyms as first-order elations and representing ex- 
pressions as logical combinations of such relations, all inferences under mode 
II could be equivalently expressed in a classical first-order system. At the same 
time, the style of inference developed in this section meshes with classical 
logic in still another way. By restricting all term sets of a collection of 
inferences to be of form F1, and employing NOT t as the only form of 
negation, one obtains a fragment of classical ogic embedded within a fuzzy 
one. 
5. HYBRID RULES 
One could, in fact, combine both modes of inference into a single form. 
Here one would have that a rule's conclusion and some subset of the premises 
are taken from linguistic variables whose terms have been assigned ranks, and 
the remaining premises are from linguistic variables that employ term algebras. 
Let us call the former mode 1premises and the latter mode Hpremises. Then 
the inference algorithm would be as follows: Nothing is inferred unless all the 
mode II premises are satisfied, in which case one applies the associated 
inference computation to the ranks of the premises of mode I. 
Another possible variant would be one that allows premises that employ 
specific (i.e., nonfuzzy) information. For example, one might admit a premise 
that asserts that the Age of X must be between 21 and 25. Such could be 
treated in much the same manner as premises of mode II; that is, nothing is 
inferred unless the premise is satisfied. For that matter, a useful variant of 
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mode U could be obtained by incorporating such specific assertions into either 
the premises or the conclusions. This would allow one to express inferences 
like 
If  Temperature _ 80 AND Humidity = High 
Then Turn Air Conditioner ON 
or, for that matter, it would allow all rules such as can be expressed in 
classical systems like Prolog. 
Expanding the present system to include such hybrid rules would clearly 
lead to additional conceptual complexities but should nonetheless be reasonably 
straightforward. For the present investigation, we will be considering only 
rules that are purely of mode I or II. 
6. EVIDENCE COMBINATION 
The problem of evidence combination arises in the present system when a 
collection of inferences is such that there is more than one pathway for 
deriving conclusions involving the same linguistic variable. To illustrate, 
consider the three linguistic variables 
Strength_of_U.S._Economy = (STRONGECONOMY,  F5) 
Current_Interest_Rates = (LOW_RATES, F6) 
Advisability_ of_ Investing_ in_ Common _ Stocks 
= (ADVISABLE_STOCKS, F6) 
together with mode I inferences 
STRONG_ECONOMY =, ADVISABLE_STOCKS 
LOW_RATES =, ADVISABLE_STOCKS 
Suppose we have the conditions STRONG_ECONOMY and VERY 
LOW_RATES. Then the inferences require us to conclude simultaneously 
both ADVISABLE_STOCKS and VERY ADVISABLE_STOCKS. The prob- 
lem is how to combine these two terms into one. Assuming that the two rules 
are of equal significance, the answer seems obvious; one should choose the 
stronger esult VERY ADVISABLE_ STOCK 
Suppose next that the conditions are RATHER STRONG_ECONOMY and 
RATHER ant(LOW_RATES). The resulting conclusions are RATHER AD- 
VISABLE-STOCKS and RATHER ant(ADVISABLE_STOCKS), represent- 
ing an equivocation. Here it seems appropriate to split the difference between 
the two results and conclude reed(ADVISABLE_STOCKS). 
But now suppose we have STRONG_ECONOMY and ant(LOW_RATES). 
In this case, the conclusions are ADVISABLE_STOCKS and ant(ADVISA- 
BLE_STOCKS). Regardless of how one chooses to interpret it, either as a 
contradiction or an ambiguity, this result cannot easily be resolved in the 
present context. One possible solution is to simply acknowledge this condition 
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by agreeing that it is equivalent to no result; that is, the inference process 
stops and yields no advice regarding investing in stocks. On the other hand, as 
an investment strategy it might also be prudent in the face of the evidence to 
explicitly recommend avoiding stocks altogether, that is, conehde ant(AD- 
VISABLE_STOCKS). 
This suggests that there is no single evidence-combination procedure that 
should be applicable uniformly across all linguistic variables. Instead, linguis- 
tic variables that are involved in conclusions of inferences may each have to be 
associated with a specially devised method that is tailored to the intended 
application. For this purpose one might extend the formal definition of the 
concept of linguistic variable by allowing for specification of various such 
methods. 
Nonetheless it seems appropriate to have at least one evidence-combination 
method that can be invoked as a default. One such method is as follows. Let 
rm,- • ", r ,  be the not necessarily distinct erms from some linguistic variable V 
that have been derived as conclusions from a collection of n inferences 
(concerning some collection of zero or more individuals). Let p be the first of 
various ranking methods described in Section 3. This assignment is adopted in 
order that the rank of primary terms be strictly greater than 1. It will be 
convenient to define 
c ,  - ~( r , )  > 1 
c2  - -1  _ o ( r i )  -< 1 
C 3 -e ( r i )  < -1  
Let r l, r 2, g3 be counts of the r i for which the respective conditions 
C 1, C 2, C 3 hold; let a t, (x 2, (x3 be averages of the Q(r i) for which the same 
conditions hold; and let r.t, %2' r~3 be the terms from V whose ranks are 
closest to the three corresponding or's, with the understanding that positive 
intermediate ranks are rounded up and negative intermediate ranks are rounded 
down. The nine possible conditions with their corresponding summary terms 
are  
r I >- r 2 > 
K 1 ~ K 2 = 
K 2 > K 1 
K 2 > K 3 
r 3 >- r 2 > 
K 3 ~ K 2 = 
r t _>" K 3 > 
r 3 > r t > 
g 1 = g 2 = 
K 3 yields 
x 3 yields 
r3 yields 
K I yields 
r i yields 
r i yields 
to2 yields 
r2 yields 
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For the foregoing three examples, this method yieMs the respective summary 
terms VERY ADVISABLE_STOCKS, med(ADVISABLE_STOCKS), and 
"contradiction." 
Similar remarks apply when the inferences are of mode II: Evidence-combi- 
nation methods can be tailored to specific linguistic variables, o r  one can 
invoke defaults. Here the methods can potentially be much more complex, 
owing to the complexity of expressions versus elementary terms. One will 
want evidence combination to correctly reflect he expressions' intuitive mean- 
ings. The problem can be simplified considerably, however, by adhering to the 
absolute character of expressions in the context of mode II, that is, the feature 
that expressions either hold or do not hold. Based on this principle, one 
straightforward yet intuitively appealing technique is as follows. Let El,- • -, e, 
be expressions from a linguistic variable V that have been derived as conclu- 
sions from a collection of n inferences of type II. As a summary expression ~, 
pick the logical disjunction of the (zero or more) elementary terms that the ~t 
have in common, that is, let e be such that 
/1 
p(E) = N p(Ei) 
i= l  
As in Section 4, the result p(e) = 0 would be taken as a contradiction, here 
further interpreted as yielding "no result." 
When a set of conclusions involving the same linguistic variable are of 
mixed type, a suggested procedure wouM be: (1) Combine the conclusions of 
the mode I inferences using an appropriate vidence combination technique, 
producing a summary term T, (2) similarly combine the conclusions of the 
mode II inferences using a suitable type II technique, giving an expression e, 
and then (3) combine ~" with e into a final term T' by a rule such as 
p(z') = p(T) f3 p(e) or into an expression e' by p(e) = p(z) U p(e). 
In addition to evidence combination, there is also the issue of evidence 
accumulation. This applies to the situation where finding new evidence that 
supports a particular conclusion tends to increase the degree to which the 
conclusion is true. For example, suppose we have the following inferences for 
evaluating a loan application: 
LOW_PROFIT_MARGIN(X) =, RISKY(X) 
INEXPERIENCED_MANAGEMENT(X) =, RISKY(X) 
WEAK_CREDITHISTORY(X)  = RISKY(X) 
The problem then is how to determine the degree of risk in a loan A for which 
more than one of the above premises is true. One may wish to conclude 
EXTREMELY RISKY, say, rather than just RISKY. Methods for doing this 
within the present context remain to be developed. At this juncture it seems 
reasonable, however, that any such methods hould make use of a counting 
approach similar to the foregoing. 
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7. INFERENCE CHAIN ING 
In order to do either forward chaining or backward chaining, one must be 
able to match the conclusions of inferences with the premises of other 
inferences. In the present system, when all inferences are of the same type, the 
method for matching conclusions of one inference with the premises of others 
is provided by the semantics described in the preceding sections. Special 
problems arise, however, when one wants to chain inferences of different 
types. Suppose we have 
e l , ' " ,  ~n = e and e'l," " ", ~ = E' 
where the conclusion E of the former is composed of terms from the same 
linguistic variable as one of the premises e~ of the latter. (For notational 
convenience, the individual variables are suppressed.) First consider the case 
that the former inference is of type I and the latter is of type 11. Then the 
conclusion of the former uses only an elementary term from some linguistic 
variable. Since the relative meaning of elementary terms is defined, there is no 
problem in determining whether E~ is satisfied; that is, the forward-chaining 
procedure in this case is already provided by the semantics for inference 
method II. 
Second, suppose that the former inference is of type II and the latter of type 
I. Then E will in general be an expression, represented as a subset of the 
associated term set T, while the deduction algorithm for the latter inference 
involves a distance measure that is defined only between terms. This shortcom- 
ing can be remedied by extending the distance measure 6 to a measure 6s 
defined on the subset of T. One way of doing this is to set, for T~, T 2 c T, 
r2)  = rain 
This measure can then be applied to the relative meanings of expressions and 
incorporated into the mode I computation i  the same manner as 6. Another 
reasonable definition for 8 s would be as the average of all distances ~(~1, %), 
where r I ~ T l and ~'2 e T2. 
A totally different, yet potentially reasonable, approach to the latter situation 
would be to apply the mode I algorithm (i.e., the one associated with the 
second inference) repeatedly for each term in p(e), yielding a set of conclu- 
sions. The overall conclusion could then be either the logical disjunction of all 
the conclusions in this set (i.e., an expression) or the term obtained by 
applying an evidence combination routine to those conclusions. This would 
have the advantage that no generalized istance measure would be needed; one 
could rely exclusively on evidence-combination techniques. 
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8. A CLASSIFICATION ALGORITHM 
Intelligent database systems are classificational in that they retrieve informa- 
tion based on a description of the kinds of records desired. Medical diagnostic 
systems provide mechanisms for classifying ailments according to observed 
symptoms and test results. Systems used for troubleshooting machinery, or 
assembly lines are also in this sense classificational. 
When the underlying reasoning system is classical two-valued logic, the 
reasoning strategy normally employed for classification problems is known as 
backward chaining or goal-directed reasoning. To illustrate, consider an 
expert system whose knowledge base is composed of a collection of infer- 
ences 
el,l ," " ' ,  ~l,n| =~. ~1 
en , l , ' ' ' ,  en,nn:=~ en 
(suppressing individual variables as before) together with a collection of facts 
or ground terms of the form 
e;(AI, I , '" ,AI,m,) 
e'm( Am, l , ' ' ' ,  Am,ram) 
Classification i  such a system amounts to hypothesizing a fact e(Al , .  •., Ak) 
and attempting to verify it or refute it via the above system. In this context, the 
hypothesized fact is known as the goal of the verification routine, which 
proceeds as follows. First one attempts to match e with the term e~ appearing 
in one of the facts. If there is a match, and the individuals in the goal also 
match those in the fact, then we are done; the goal is verified. If there is no 
match with a fact, then one next tries to match e with the conclusion ei of an 
inference. If this cannot be done, the goal is regarded as refuted. Assuming 
there is such a match, then the individual variables in the inference are 
instantiated with the individuals appearing in the goal. In this manner, verifica- 
tion of the given goal reduces to verification of all the instantiated premises. 
This is undertaken by invoking the above procedure recursively, with each 
such premise taken as a new goal. Eventually one arrives at all ground terms, 
and the original goal is verified; or else matching fails at some point and the 
goal is refuted. This strategy thus employs the closed-world assumption, 
which asserts that the only true facts are those that follow logically from the 
given knowledge, or, contxapositively, anything that does not logically follow 
from the knowledge base is false. 
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The dual of backward chaining is forward chaining or data-directed 
reasoning. Here one moves forward from the known facts, using the infer- 
ences in the knowledge base to derive conclusions regarding the individuals 
mentioned in the facts. Whereas, as mentioned, backward chaining is typically 
used for diagnosis or classification, forward chaining is typically used for 
prediction and control. 
The present system uses a classification algorithm that incorporates aspects 
of both forward and backward chaining. This is necessary because of the 
nature of the information that the system provides. Here, instead of presenting 
a goal to be verified, one asks that a certain collection of individuals be 
classified according to a particular linguistic variable. For example, instead of 
asking something like "SUITABLE(Jack)?" and receiving either "Yes"  or 
"No"  as a reply, one here asks "Suitability(Jack)?" and receives the reply 
"RATHER SUITABLE." Thus classification is in this case a form of linguis- 
tic ranking. 
A thumbnail sketch of the algorithm is as follows. Suppose that individuals 
A1,. •., Ate are to be classified according to a linguistic variable V, that is, the 
query is V(A~, . . ' ,  Ak)? The first step is to search all facts 
~(Ai ,  I , . . . ,  Ai, mi ) for one in which e~ is an expression from V. For each 
such fact, one checks whether the individuals in the fact match those in the 
query. If they do (we here assume that this can happen for at most one fact), 
then the expression e~ is returned as the result. If no such matching fact is 
found, then one next searches the rule list for any rules in which the expression 
ei appearing in the conclusion is from the given V. Assuming that such rules 
are found, one then begins to build a deduction tree. At the root of the tree is 
the rule's concluding expression ~;, with individual variables instantiated by 
the given individuals A1 , - . . ,  At,, and its children are the premises of the 
rule, similarly instantiated with the corresponding individuals. When there is 
more than one rule with concluding expressions from V, these must be treated 
similarly, and the entire collection of concluding (parent) nodes must in some 
manner be grouped together, for example, by introducing a higher level node 
to which all the concluding nodes are attached as children. The main idea is 
that one must keep track of all possible ways in which the system allows one to 
deduce xpressions from V for the individuals of concern. 
The algorithm proceeds by invoking the foregoing recursively on the 
bottom-level ements of the current version of the deduction tree. This process 
terminates with "no result" if at some point it fails to match with either a fact 
or a rule conclusion. Otherwise, it continues until a final deduction tree is 
created wherein all paths terminate in a leaf that matches with a fact. 
Given this tree, one then begins forward-chaining back up the tree, applying 
the associated deduction algorithms and, wherever some conclusion odes have 
been grouped together, applying an evidence-combination r utine. In this 
manner one arrives back at the top of the tree with the desired reply. 
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A potentially useful variation on this algorithm would be to have the system 
query the user for information when it is unable to perform a match at a leaf. 
This would amount o asking the user to classify a particular set of individuals 
with respect to a certain linguistic variable. The user's response would then be 
formulated as a fact and added to the knowledge base. In this manner the user 
can participate in the reasoning and ensure that the classification process will 
succeed. 
It is noteworthy that in this algorithm the closed-world assumption, strictly 
speaking, is not assumed. This is a direct consequence of the fact that nothing 
is regarded as categorically true or false. On  the other hand, one nonetheless 
does have a type of "closed-world" assumption in that the system provides a 
"best" classification based on whatever information is available. Obtaining 
"no result" in this context means only that the information contained in the 
knowledge base is insufficient to make a useful determination. 
9. CONCLUSION 
This paper has laid the foundation for a symbolic approach to linguistic 
reasoning, and it has outlined a system that can realize this approach in a 
concrete implementation. There are numerous related lines of investigation, 
however, that remain to be pursued. Some of these concern topics appearing 
within the formalism already laid down, while others concern ways in which 
the current system can be expanded. 
Within the foregoing, one subject hat deserves further consideration is that 
of evidence combination, together with the related subject of evidence accumu- 
lation. Some intuitively plausible schemes have been presented, but it is also 
clear that no one scheme can be universally applicable. Hence the opportunity 
exists for additional such schemes to be proposed. Another subject is that of a 
forward-chaining algorithm. Such would be needed should one wish to employ 
the given modes of linguistic reasoning in systems, say, for strategic planning 
or production control. 
Outside the current frame is the concept of linguistic likelihood and its 
relation to fuzzy quantification. As illustrated by the example given in the 
introduction, there appears to be a natural connection between the everyday 
use of LIKELY and MOST~ There is a need to understand how humans reason 
with such terminology and to determine how such concepts can best be 
introduced into the formalisms already laid down. Another subject mentioned 
in the introduction is the problem of integrating the various symbolic modes of 
inference with the earlier denotational modes. There clearly are practical 
situations in which the denotational versions of fuzzy inference are the 
preferred means of automatic ontrol. The task of integrating two such 
disparate styles of reasoning within a single system will raise many theoretical 
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and pragmatic onsiderations. Particular issues are those of noumonotonicity 
and truth maintenance in a fuzzy reasoning system. 
Also worthy of consideration is the possibility of further augmenting the 
system with applications of neural nets and case-based reasoning. Neural nets 
conceivably can be used to scan large databases and extract fuzzy inference 
rules, which can then be manipulated using the methods outlined above. How 
case-based methods might best be integrated with rule-based systems has yet to 
be determined, but one approach that seems promising is to associate ach rule 
with lists of cases that either confirm or deny the rule's validity. Then, before 
invoking a particular rule, one would first search the rule's list of cases to see 
whether there is one that fits the situation of concern. In this way, rule-based 
reasoning would be used to establish a higher-level control of the case-based 
process. 
Finally, there is the issue of knowledge acquisition for fuzzy expert systems 
and the task of identifying problem domains in which fuzzy expert systems 
might be employed. It is common knowledge that human experts routinely 
reason effectively with imprecise linguistic information, but the rules they 
employ to this end are almost never written down.Thus, as with conventional 
expert systems, the problem of knowledge acquisition remains a significant 
bottleneck. It is hoped that as more fuzzy reasoning systems are developed and 
implemented asfunctioning tools for expert system design, the domain expert 
themselves will become aware of these tools' capabilities and begin to formu- 
late their knowledge in appropriate ways. This should then have the reciprocal 
effect of stimulating new advances in the abstract methodology, no doubt 
leading to the discovery and formulation of entirely new aspects of innate 
human reasoning. Thus, in this spirit of man as tool-maker, we can expect hat 
the field of artificial intelligence will continue to evolve. 
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